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Transactions of the Nebraska Academy of Sciences- Volume VII, 1979

THE BRAIN: PHYSIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF EVALUATION AND MEMORY

JEFF C. SCHANK
Department of Philosophy
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Lincoln, Nebraska 68588

Behavioristic axiomatizations of human evaluation have been well
established (von Newmann and Morgenstern, 1953; Leinfellner, 1969).
The axiomatization of the evaluative interpretation scheme can be applied to the historical sciences and provides a model of historical time.
Newtonian time can be defined by imposing a strict serial order on
temporal events by means of the relations of simultaneity and succession, which has been axiomatized recently (Leinfellner, 1966). The
former axiomatization of the structure of evaluation can be combined
with the latter axiomatization of the structure of temporally ordered
memory, based on preference and indifference relations of an individual as he evaluates past events or future possible events. The author's
intention is to go a step further and incorporate the organization of the
brain as foundations of memory time and evaluation. In recent pUblications, Pribram (1976) showed that the organization of the brain fulfills
the requirements of the von Newmann and Morgenstern axiomatization
of evaluation. Further, research has shown that memory is correlated
with certain biochemical changes in the brain. In short, we obtain a
new solution for the mind-body problem with respect to evaluative
behavior and decision-making, especially with respect to evaluation of
an individual's history.

t t t
INTRODUCTION
When considering an individual's history, the historical
and, in general, the social sciences have asked why events of
an individual's history occurred (Leinfellner, 1973). This
problem has been approached by a strict causal or determin~tic ordering of events, objects, and actions from past to future
as sufficient for an explanation of a person's history. But
problems arise with this approach to an individual's history.
For example:
A person learns a language (a e ) in anticipation of the
prospect of immigrating in the near future to the country
where this language is spoken. In such a case he will
evaluate learning this language very highly according to
an activist's attitude. But if this same individual after
arriving in this new country becomes involved in an

accident, he may devalue this same act of the past (a e )
after he has experienced all the troubles which were
consequences of the accident (l..einfellner, 1973).
This example illustrates the importance of evaluation in a
person's history, while also illustrating the inadequacy of
causal or deterministic orderings of events as an explanation
of a person's history. Therefore, instead of asking why events
of an individual's history occurred, we should ask why an
individual evaluated an event in a particular way.
In this paper, evidence from brain research is used to
develop foundations for behavioristic axiomatizations of
evaluation and memory time (i.e., those events which are
represented in the brain and temporally ordered). If the
organization of the brain fulfills the requirements of the axiomatizations of evaluation and memory time, then there are
inbuilt orientation schemata which are called value spaces for
value orientation and individual decision-making, and memory
spaces for time orientation. Both value and memory spaces
can be combined to form an orientation scheme which is
called historical time for evaluation of past events (retrospects)
or future possible events (prospects). In short, I will show that
the organization of the brain fulfills the axiomatizations of
evaluation and memory time which can be combined to defme
one of the more common spaces human beings evaluate and
make decisions about with respect to their individual histories.
In order to show that historical time is an innate space
for evaluation and decision-making with regard to the past
or future of an individual, I will, for simplicity, separately
develop the brain foundations for the axiomatization of
evaluation and then the axiomatization of memory time. But
first, I will examine what a space is, and how the axiomatizations of evaluation, memory time, and evaluation and memory
time combined (historical time) satisfy the requirements of a
space.
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Leinfellner (unpublished) outlined the fundamental
assumptions which every adequate defmition of a space should
fulfill.

Fundamental assumptions about spaces:
1. A space should be describable by empirically valid
statements called empirical spatial descriptions which belong
to an empirical language.
2. A space should be either the intuitive order or the
abstract conceptual form of (1) and may be called the order
function of spaces.
3. A space should be defmable as a system of mathematical or abstract objects with relations defined between them.
This is the structural conception of spaces described by a
theoretical language .
4. A space should be a two-fold system of subsystems.
There are in most cases three subsystems consisting of "an
empirical space" having a recognizable intuitive order, capable
of an abstract definition.

Definition of a space: A space can be defmed as any
system of subsystems, or any system of representation, if it is
a basic or epistemological structure and if:
5.

At least one structural description is empirical.

6. At least one of the relations R: is at least a quasi
series founding relation and one R., where i = j and 1 ;;:. i,
j;;:' 1 is an identity relation.
J
7. At least one of the representation functions is a
measurement function.
Therefore, the structures of evaluation and memory time,
defined axiomatically, are value and memory spaces respectively if and only if the following conditions are fulfilled:
First, the axiomatic definitions of evaluation and memory
time must fulfill the definition of a space and parts (2) and
(3) of the fundamental assumptions about spaces. Second, the
interpretations of the axioms defining evaluation and memory
time must fulfill parts (1) and (4) of the fundamental assumptions about spaces. The axiomatizations of evaluation and
memory time satisfy the requirements of a space; thus historical time, defined by a combined axiomatization of evaluation
and memory time, satisfies the requiremcnts of a space (Leinfellner, 1973 and unpublished).

examine Pribram's systems approach to brain function. Th'
IS
.
.
approac }1 assumes two b aSlc processes, I.e., operators (nerv
impulses) and states (neuroelectric). Classically, the neUro e
has been viewed as the sole organizer of the nervous syste n
but Sherrington's (1906) work with the complexities of t~;
reflex demonstrated the importance of the properties of th
synapse (e.g., the slow potential microstructure). The distinc~
tion between nerve impulses and graded slow potentials is
stated succinctly by Pribram (1971):
The present emphasis is on the slow potentials them.
selves; the suggestion is that the slow potentials prodUce
patterns which serve a function in addition to a role in
impulse transmission: the view taken here is that the slow
potential pattern "computes" both the spatial neighbor.
hood interactions among neural elements and, to Some
extent, the temporal interactions over a range of sites by
a continuous (analogue) rather than a discrete, all-or-none
(digital) mechanism (Pribram, 1971).
Moreover, Pribram and Gill (1976) have outlined the basic
logic of the two-process mechanism of brain function:
The most generally known innovation in control theory
has been the formal description of the concept of feed.
back (e.g., see Miller, Galunter and Pribram, 1960), a
circular process initiated by a test, a matching of two
settings. When there is a mismatch, one of the settings
becomes fixed while the other triggers an operation which
continues until a match is produced. Thus a test-operate·
test-exist sequence, a TOTE, characterizes the feedback:
for example, if the setting of a thermostat and that of
room temperature are incongruent, i.e. mismatch, a fur·
nace is either turned on or off until congruence is estab·
lished.
More recently, anuther, equally useful conception,
fccdforward (e.g., S0C l'ribram, 1(71) has been found
important. In fcedforward control, an operation proceeds
to a predetermined end point. For example, in most
apartments, the furnace continues to operate for fixed
periods, irrespective of local temperature conditions
(Pribram and Gill, 1976).

BRAIN MECHANISMS OF A VALUE SPACE

BRAIN FUNCTION: A TWO-PROCESS MECHANISM

Since my purpose in this section is to develop the neuro·
logical foundations of a value space, only a limited set of
axioms (Leinfellner, unpublished) will be considered for
simplicity (for a complete set of axioms, see Leinfelln er ,
19(9). The set ofaxioms is divided into three groups: mixture,
order, and measurement.

Before developing the brain's physiological foundations of
cvaluation and memory time, it will be useful to briefly

<x, P; >-. '\/) def1nes the structure of evaluation (V) if
and only if the following condit ions are fulfilled.

ISS

Axiom 1. For any tuble (xI' x2' ... , x n ) to which PI' P2'
.. , Pn can be adjoined, where P(el) = PI' P(e2) = P 2 , ... ,
.
n
p(e n) '" Pn and 0 <; P(ei) <; I and for which Pi = I, the mix·

t

ture of xI' x2' ... , xn with probabilities PI' P2' ... , Pn denoted
bY (Pj xI' P2 x 2' ... , Pnxn) is a uniquely defined element of V.

Interpretation: A value xi is ascribed by a person under certain
conditions at a time, t, to objects, actions, and events ai
which indicates a relative place xi the object possesses within
the ranking order xl' x2' ... , xn · Thus, if an individual can
adduce the appropriate probabilities PI' P2' ... , PI1' he can also
match the probabilities with the values.

We need to assume that human beings as well as higher
animals have an innate tendency to improve and refine-evaluation judgments (Leinfellner, unpublished). This assumption is
needed because it explains and justifies an important characteristic of a value space, i.e, to be a mixture space. A mixture space involves the use of probability by an individual in
refining evaluations. Since human beings are able to sharpen
and refine evaluations, each justification of evaluation is a
justification of probability, and thus evaluation and probability are mutually interdependent and subjective.
Pribram (1976) has taken the first step towards the development of the brain mechanisms for evaluation, i.e., by showing a basis in the brain for the axiomatization of evaluation by
von l\cwmann and Morgenstern (1953). Although similar to
the axiomatization presented here, their axiomatization is not
complete. Nevertheless, much of the development of the neurological foundations of von Newmann and Morgenstern's utility
theory is applicable to the axiomatization of evaluation
presented here.
Values (Pribram, 1976) are expressed by need-satisfying
behaviors. In other words, values have their basis in biological
needs; a quantification of internal controls over behavior leading t(\ the satisfaction of biological needs. The mechanisms
which control biological needs can be classified into three
major categories. The first mechanism regulates the amount of
appropriate behavior engaged in, and is called the satiety
mechanism. A second mechanism readies the individual to
behave in a particular manner and initiates the appropriate
behaVior. The third mechanism coordinates the other two
mechanisms into a smoothly running system.
The satiety mechanism is organized by a closed-looped
feedback process. Research (Pribram and Bagshaw, 1953)
showed that monkeys with a removed amygadala failed to
have a cutoff point beyond which they would refuse nonpreferred objects, while unoperated monkeys did have a cutoff
Point. This indicated that the amygadala controls the amount
of behavior that satisfies a biological need once it is initiatcd.

The readiness mechanism is organized by a helical-loop feedforward process, operating similar to a dial on a thermostat.
This mechanism processes information because alternatives
are involved, e.g., the dial setting of a thermostat involves the
alternatives "off" and "on." Research (Anand and Brobeck,
1952) has shown that rats with a damaged far-lateral hypothalamus starved to death. This suggested that the far-lateral
hypothalamus controls the amount of behavior that is initiated. The coordination mechanism shifts control from the
feedback to the feedforward process. Anand (1963) showed
that the satiety and the readiness mechanisms for feeding are
reciprocally coupled. His experiments showed that when the
satiety mechanism was active the readiness mechanism was
inhibited.
Furthermore, probabilities are an individual's estimate of
the likelihood that the occurrence of particular behaviors will
satisfy particular needs. Research has demonstrated a mechanism which estimates the probability that the occurrence of
a particular need-satisfying behavior will satisfy a biological
need. Evidence supporting a probability estimating mechanism
comes from monkeys with resectioned frontal lobes. These
monkeys were unable to distribute their responses probabilistically from prior experiences, as do non-resectioned monkeys
(Pribram, 1961). Moreover, for the axiomatization of evaluation discussed here, we must show that the amount of needs
and desires, and the estimate of probability, are multiplicatively related and mutually interdependent. Pribram (1976)
supported a multiplicative relation between values and probabilities by the close link between the brain systems regulating
values and the brain systems involved in probability estimation. This close link, both anatomically and functionally, of
these brain systems also indicates their mutual interdependence.

Axiom 2. The subspace (V,

>-,

Interpretation: "V" is the set of values;

'V) is quasi-ordered.

">-" is the

prefer-

ence relation; "'V" is the indifference relation.
Brain mechanisms involved in establishing preferences
have been shown to be separate from those regulating the satisfaction of biological needs and the estimation of probability
(Pribram, 1976). Pribram (1969) showed that removal of areas
remote from those mechanisms involved in need-satisfaction
and the estimation of probability interfere with discrimination of choices between cues. This discrimination of choices
has been shown (Irwin, 1958) to indicate preferences. Preferences are then dependent on a mechanism which involves
the ability to discriminate between situations that lead to satisfaction, and thus are situation dependent, reflecting the
invariant properties of the situation. Therefore, the use of
"signs" is required, i.e., the mechanism by which preferences
become organized. "Signs are made and recognized when
motor mechanisms operate on the junctional patterns initiated
by input. ... Signs become communicative acts that remain
159

invariant over a large variety of contexts. . . " (Pribram,
1971).

Axiom 3. If xi
Xj

"v

>-

Xj

>- xk' there exists a p such that

(pxi' (1 - P)xk)' Interpretation: If an individual reveals

his preferences in the following manner: P(ai' aj ) and P(aj , ak)
where (>-/P) , and if one is indifferent between a mixture
(pxi' (I - p)xk) and Xj' the probability, p, indicates the relative
interval: xk - x/xk - Xi'
This axiom, if empirically valid, entails linear transformational properties and makes a value space into a measurement
space. The mixture of need-satisfying behavior must be measurable by at least an ordinal scale and at most an interval
scale. Pribram (I976) proposed that values are measurable in
terms of the amount of behavior needed in their satisfaction,
provided a "zero" point is agreed upon.
These axioms, based on the organization of the brain,
show that a value space is an innate mechanism of value
orientation and individual decision-making. It is not assumed
that the evaluator is an idealized figure with unlimited logical
faculties and computational capacities. In individual decisionmaking, computation requires the use of a finite number of
symbols or tokens in describing events of one's environment.
Pribram (I 971) has described how symbols develop:
These develop when the brain's motor mechanisms become engaged in perception and feeling. The resulting
coding operations construct signs and symbols ... symbols, when motor mechanisms operate on junctional
core-brain receptive processes. _ .. Symbol communication almost completely depends on the context in which
symbols occur. (Pribram, 1971)_
BRAIN MECHANISMS OF A MEMORY SPACE

A memory space is defined by an order axiom which demands some minimal properties for establishing a temporal
order of memory by the relations of simultaneity and succession. Leiilfellner (I 966) axiomatized serial time which we now
apply to memory time.
(M;
order.

>,

= )

defines the structure of a temporal memory

Axiom 4_ 3.1 For any ml e M, ml

m 2 , m3 eM, if mi

any mI' m2 e M, if MI

then m2

> m2' then not (m2 > m I ); 3.5

any mI' m2' m3 e M, then not (m i
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m 1 ; 3.2 For any

= mI; 3.3 For any ml'
= m2 and m2 = m3' then mi = m3; 3.4 For

ml' m2 e M, if ml

= m2'

=

For

=m 2) if and only if m i >

m 2 or m 2

> mI'

Interpretation: "M" is a set of memories

stored in the brain;

">" is

the succession relation; "=" is the

simultaneity relation.
To demonstrate a neurological basis for a memory space
there should be brain mechanisms satisfying the foll owin '
requirements: (a) external stimuli must be encoded int~
neural representations, (b) neural representations of external
stimuli must be stored, (c) it must be possible to retrieve speci.
fic stored experiences, (d) retrieved information must he
decoded into a state which recreates the original experience
(e) it must be possible to recognize external stimuli from pre:
viously stored experiences, and (f) memories must be ordered
in the brain.
Coding operations of external stimuli take place in the
nervous system when physical energy is sensed by receptors
and transformed into nerve impulses. When nerve impulses
reach synaptic networks, the discrete signals become enCoded
in the slow potential microstructure (Pribram, 1971). Two
classes of codes are involved; i.e., codes involving nerve im.
pulses and codes involving slow potentials. Impulse coding
uses both temporal and spatial codes, and are "read" by a
mechanism in the central nervous system. This readout of the
impulse-coded messages takes place in the neural junctions, in
the production of slow potential microstructure, resulting in
momentary states. Further, two classes of transfer functions
are employed by the readout mechanism. Some transfer func·
tions allow reversibility, i.e., a one-to-one mapping between
ciphers of a code. Other transfer functions are irreversible
unless a key exists to decipher a code, e.g., the alphabet.
It is a characteristic of states that they are modifiable.
Therefore, permanent modifiability of coded neural represen·
tations should be possible. The process of chemical induction
has been proposed as a model of permanent memory storage.
The process of neural induction is similar to the process that
takes place during embryological development of an organism.
The relation between inductor and substrate is stated by
Pribram (1971):
1. Inductors evoke and organize the genetic potential
of the organism.
2. Inductors are relatively specific as to the character
they evoke but are relatively non-specific relative to
individuals and tissues.
3. Inductors determine the broad outlines of the
ind uced character; details are specified by action of the
substrate.
4. Inductors do not just trigger development; they
are a special class of stimuli.
5. Inductors must be in contact with their substrate
in order to be effective; however, mere contact is insuffi·
cient to produce the effect-the tissue must be readY,
must be competent to react.

6. Indaction usually proceeds by a two-way interact;un, by a chemical conversation between inductor and
subst rate (Pribram, 1971).

Neural induction is initiated by intermediate memory mech·

;nis!TI S, Excitation of nerves starts the production of neural

RNA whjch induces configurational changes by chemical
"convcr::ltions." These chemical conversations are reversible
and (':ii! fade, unless maintained by repetition of the same
pattern,
Jr! jIe brain, neural inducticm accomplishes permanent
Olodil'j,lbility of neural tissue in three ways (Pribram, 1971).
IhMn (1976) outlined a mechanism of chemical storage,
I\~en '-,il individual learns a sufficiently difficult task, a short·
production of protein starts, and involves at least two
; one is called the SlOO protein. Furthe!, at least two
are synthesized in the membranes of I he synap·
long lasting nerve cell changes involve protein
cbanges which become inscribed in a certain pattern
membrane of millions of neurons. An!)t her mode of
modi!
is neural grmvth. Neurons have growth cones
whicL i, given an open path, elongate the nerve fiber tip.
EvLii
(Rose, Malis, and Baker, 196]) showed that neural
i,; possible and appears to bccllhanced
a rich ex(Iknnett Diumund, Krech, ,mel Rosencweig, 19(4).
Fina!h neuroglia plays a role in neural modifiability. It may
be
"ligudendroglia direct the growth cones of neurons.
Evii,i c!<;,,; f,-,'m the peripheral nervous system shuwed Thilt
SChWdldl cells, a close relative of glia, guide the direction
the ;.'l'}wth of nerve l1bcrs that regenerate after injury. In
shon. any (d' the three basic lllUlk, of neural modifiabilny
arc
as a change in the microstructure of junctional
Sllh\ i ',kntial activity,
\",. now tUnt to the probh'lll of how It is pussible to
recall and to recognize specific inf()IJllatiun and decode
it illtu a state which recreates the original experience. In
order to accomplish this, there should be an organizing process
which allows stored information to be decoded into an
experknce that recreates the original experience. Pribram
(1971) proposed that the junctional microstructure of slow
potentials provides this organization. He derived a model
of neural organization from the optical process of holography.
A neural holographic mechanism of information storage
rests on two assumptions: First, neural representations of input are not photographic, but consist initially of a set of
feature detectors and a set of transformations similar to those
for the optical process of holography. Neural holographic
images result from interference patterns; i.e., when arrival
patterns converge from at least two sources their designs produce interference (conveniently viewed in wave-mechanical
terms). Second, assume that these interference patterns of
postsynaptic patterns are coordinate with awareness. It then

follows that information is distributed over the entire extent
of the neural pattern similar to that of a physical hologram.
Nevertheless, a major difficulty with a neural holographic
mechanism arises; i.e., "brain waves" as presently recorded are
insufficient for a significant interference pattern, since brain
waves carry only a small amount of information (Pribram,

1971 ),
With a neural holographic mechanism of information storage, we can detail the mechanisms of recall and recognition.
The mechanism of recall involves a feedforward process, while
recognition is a content-addressable feedback mechanism.
During recall, a stimulating event triggers a short·term memory
mechanism. Retrieval requires simply the repetition of the
pattern or essential features of it which originally induced
storage resulting in an interference pattern of the junctional
slow potential microstructure which recreates the original
experience. On the other hand, during recognition short-term
memory is often not involved; images can be reconstructed
even from input that only partially replicates stored information. Juxtaposition of input and long-term memory is entailed in recognition, a best fit is quickly attained through
cross-correlatio!ls among simultaneously occurring and interfering wave fronts of slow potentials. A neural holographic
process of recall and recognition has the advantage of doing
away wilh the need for keeping track of where information
is stored, because content can be recalled or recognized without reference to location.
Memory, however, also tells us in which direction we
move through time; we remember the past but not the future.
Then, somehow, memory is temporally ordered. A directed
graph model of memory storage would impose a temporal
order or directional order to memory engrams, fulfilling the
axiomatization of memory time, since directed graph models
can be mapped onto set-theoretical models (lIaJ'ary, Norman,
and Cartright, 1965). Engrams would not be required to have a
particular location in the brain; all that is required is a directional ordering of engrams. Lashley (1958) proposed that
tonic activity (neuroelectric states) provides memory storage
with its directional character:
The background of tonic activity would determine the
direction of attention and of the flow of thought, restricting it to related associations. It would provide the binding
force that holds together the temporal sequences through
memory span, and more permanent associations (Lashley,
1958).
Now we can make the following conjecture: the directional character of memory is imposed by the junctional microstructure of slow potentials, conveniently viewed by a directed
graph model. A directed graph model of memory storage is
compatible with existing evidence and with a neural holographic process.
161
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